What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms? by Davis, Kevin E.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 26 Issue 1 
2004 
What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law 
Reforms? 
Kevin E. Davis 
New York University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 
141 (2004). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol26/iss1/6 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WHAT CAN THE RULE OF LAW VARIABLE
TELL US ABOUT RULE OF LAW REFORMS?
Kevin E. Davis*
I. IN TRODU CTION ......................................................................... 141
II. POTENTIAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES .................................... 145
III. ILLU STRATIONS ......................................................................... 148
A . R ule of Law ........................................................................ 148
B . P roperty R ights .................................................................. 151
C. Contract Enforcement ....................................................... 156
1. Contract Intensive M oney ........................................... 157
2 . IC R G ........................................................................... 157
3. World Business Environment Survey ......................... 158
4. The Lex M undi Project ............................................... 159
D . Legal H eritage ................................................................... 160
IV . C ONCLU SION ............................................................................ 160
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001 per capita income in Haiti was $480, the infant mortality
rate was seventy-nine per 1000 live births and the illiteracy rate (age fif-
teen and over) hovered around fifty percent. By comparison, in the
United States, less than two hours flying time away, the per capita in-
come was $34,280, the infant mortality rate was seven per 1000 live
births, and the illiteracy rate was negligible.' Understanding the reasons
why these sorts of disparities in important measures of development
arise and persist is one of the greatest challenges in all of the social sci-
ences.
For a few brief years in the 1960s and the early 1970s, American le-
gal academics joined with their colleagues in other disciplines to
investigate these issues in an exercise now known as the "law and devel-
opment" movement. Eventually, however, the principal participants in
the exercise became disillusioned and lost their faith in the ability of law,
much less legal scholarship, to contribute to development. Thus, the law
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and development movement in the United States died a noisy and well-
documented death.2
Between approximately the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s the
American legal academy turned its back on development studies. At the
same time, mainstream development studies also largely turned its back
on law. During this period development issues were viewed as the proper
domain of economists and political scientists. The economists largely
focused on topics such as interest rates, tariffs, subsidies and wage and
price controls.3 Meanwhile, political scientists focused on meta-issues
such as whether developing countries were better off adopting democ-
racy or authoritarianism.4 Now in the post-Cold War era, the situation is
completely different. Both inside and outside the academy, capitalism
has triumphed and little or no effort is being made to revive communism.
Virtually all attention is now focused upon methods of establishing or
enhancing the performance of capitalist economies.
Laws and legal institutions feature prominently in this new intellec-
tual terrain. One reason for this is that economists have become more
attuned to the potential economic functions of legal institutions. It is now
widely accepted that markets are unlikely to function in the absence of
bodies of contract law and systems of property rights (defined broadly to
include corporate and commercial law) that encourage exchange and
investment, the two main wealth-creating activities in a capitalist sys-
tem. Similarly, political scientists are now well aware of the fact that the
political arrangements that they tend to regard as being characteristic of
developed societies-such as democracy, respect for human rights and
the welfare state-are almost invariably defined and protected by legal
norms and institutions, especially constitutions and the courts that inter-
2. LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds.
1993); John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style,
Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977);
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470
(1995) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed., vol. 2, 1992)); David M.
Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in
Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062.
3. For overviews of the relevant literature in development economics see generally,
JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1997);
MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1999).
4. For examples of work in this vein see Seymour Lipset, Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 69
(1959); Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, 7 J.
ECON. PERSP. 51 (1993).
5. DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE (1990); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A
CHANGING WORLD (1997).
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pret them.6 These insights have led to a consensus that the overall "qual-
ity" of legal institutions is an important determinant of development.
7
This view is typically expressed in shorthand form by the assertion that
the "rule of law" is an essential pre-condition to development! Moti-
vated by this consensus, multilateral institutions and developed countries
have invested tremendous amounts of resources in efforts to reform legal
institutions in developing countries.9
Optimistic claims about the role of legal institutions in achieving de-
velopment have a long lineage. In fact, most contemporary versions of
this theory can be traced back to the turn-of-the-century writings of Max
Weber. '° But theoretical analyses that are skeptical about whether legal
institutions play an independent role in achieving development, or any
other form of social change, are equally easy to find. For example,
Engels understood a society's level of economic development as a factor
explaining, rather than being explained by, the characteristics of its laws
and legal institutions." Similarly but more recently, in declaring the end
of the first law and development movement, Trubek and Galanter ques-
tioned whether legal institutions (and in particular the courts) played a
central role at all in developing countries.'
2
Given that both optimistic and skeptical claims about law and devel-
opment seem equally coherent, what explains the recent abundance of
optimism? I would suggest that part of the explanation lies in the fact
that in recent years the law optimists have achieved a form of methodo-
logical superiority over the skeptics by more effectively deploying
empirical analyses in support of their claims. Historically, the empirical
6. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST
AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 39 (2000) (discussing the role of an independent judiciary in
sustaining democracy).
7. WORLD BANK, supra note 5; see also, HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH:
THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 185-87 (1989).
8. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (Mar./Apr.
1998); IBRAHIM Fl. SHIHATA, COMPLEMENTARY REFORM: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, JUDICIAL AND
OTHER INSTITUTIONS REFORMS SUPPORTED BY THE WORLD BANK (1997).
9. Carothers, supra note 8.
10. Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East
Asia, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 829 (2000); David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of
Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 720. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (1978).
11. Friedrich Engels, Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 603 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).
12. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 2. For a more recent example of a skeptical ap-
proach to law and development see FRANK UPHAM, MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW
ORTHODOXY (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series, Working Paper No.
30, 2002). For a more extensive discussion of the recent intellectual history of law and devel-
opment see KEVIN DAVIS & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE RECENT INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2004) (unpublished).
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basis for optimistic claims about therole of law was, at least by the stan-
dards of most modem social scientists, shaky. Weber, for example, based
his conclusions upon qualitative analyses of a wide range of societies,
both historical and contemporary, that were of dubious accuracy. My
impression, however, is that the empirical bases for skeptical claims
were typically just as anecdotal and subjective.
This all changed in the early 1990s, when an intrepid group of
economists began to conduct statistical analyses of cross-country data to
establish the existence of causal connections between quantitative meas-
ures of the characteristics of legal institutions and measures of social and
economic development. The most prominent examples of these studies
are ones that claim to have found a causal relationship between respect
for the rule of law and levels of economic growth."3 Other studies, how-
ever, have also claimed to find causal relationships between legal
variables-by which I mean simply any variable that purports to meas-
ure characteristics of a legal system-such as protection of property
rights and the enforceability of contracts and various measures of the
level of development. 4 Still other studies have established relationships
between countries' legal heritage (meaning the historical origins of their
legal system) and their levels of economic development.'-
This literature is often interpreted as providing a strong empirical
grounding for optimistic perspectives on law and development. 16 For ex-
ample, in a well-known series of papers, Clague, Keefer, Knack, and
Olson devised an innovative variable called Contract Intensive Money
(CIM) that they claim measures the enforceability of contracts. After
conducting a variety of regression analyses and finding a positive rela-
tionship between CIM, investment, and growth, the authors go on to
state:
Countries with low CIM (or low scores on other, more subjective
measures of contract rights and property security) would be ad-
vised to examine closely government policies related to
enforcement of contracts between private economic actors and
13. See ROBERT J. BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY
EMPIRICAL STUDY (1997); DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., GOVERNANCE MATTERS, (The World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196, 1999).
14. Christopher Clague et al., Institutions and Economic Performance: Property Rights
and Contract Enforcement, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND
GOVERNANCE IN LESS-DEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 67-90 (Christopher
Clague ed., 1997).
15. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
16. For a brief non-technical survey of this literature, see Frank B. Cross, Law and
Economic Growth, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1737 (2002).
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the due process guarantees that governments afford firms and
individuals when they create and implement policies.1
7
This understanding of the significance of cross-country statistical
analyses appears to be particularly prevalent within the World Bank. 8
The World Bank has conducted, or at least sponsored, several cross-
country statistical analyses of the relationship between legal variables
and measures of development. One prominent set of studies uses a large
number of subjective measures of institutional quality-meaning data
obtained from either polls of country experts or surveys of residents-
grouped into six clusters, "voice and accountability," "political stability,"
"government effectiveness," "regulatory quality," "rule of law" (which
includes variables measuring respect for property rights), and "control of
corruption."' 9 Other important studies use data derived from surveys of
lawyers (the Lex Mundi study) or business enterprises (the World Busi-
ness Environment Survey) based in the relevant countries. 20 All of these
studies generally find positive correlations between the legal variables
that they employ and measures of development, and their results are
commonly cited in key World Bank publications advocating legal re-
forms in developing countries.2' Over the past decade, in a strong display
of legal optimism, the World Bank has made significant investments in
funding these types of reforms.
II. POTENTIAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Statistical analyses that attempt to use legal variables to explain
measures of development are open to at least three basic sorts of objec-
tions. 23 First, one might question the choice of dependent variable. In
17. Christopher Clague et al., Contract-Intensive Money, 4 J. ECON. GROWTH 185, 205
(1999).
18. For an articulate statement of the role of empirical analysis as a guide to legal reform
see Daniel Kaufmann, Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy (2003),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/pdf/rethinkgov-stanford.pdf.
19. KAUFMANN ET AL., supra note 13.
20. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions (October 2004),
available at http:llecon-www.mit.edu/faculty/download-pdf.php?id=660.
21. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MARKETS 19 (2002); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY 50, 103 (2000); WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGU-
LATION (2004).
22. See generally, WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: 2004
EDITION (2004).
23. For a similar methodological discussion with greater emphasis on concerns about
the reliability of cross-country legal variables, see Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Finding and Fac-
ing Facts about Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment in South Asia, 23 LEGAL STUD.
649 (2003). For methodological critiques of studies relying on other cross-country data on
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other words, one might question whether the variables chosen to meas-
ure the level of development accurately capture all of the features of a
society that are relevant to promoting development. For instance, one
might argue that a society's per capita income, perhaps the most com-
monly used measure of development, is a poor measure of whether a
society embodies the kind of tolerance, respect, and broadly distributed
opportunities for human flourishing that characterize a truly developed
society. My focus here is on problems that stem from the legal variables
used in these studies and so, although important, this line of argument,
which inevitably leads to the controversial question-what is develop-
ment?-will not be pursued here.
A second line of attack would be to question the choice of legal vari-
ables and ask whether they actually provide useful information about
societies' legal systems. In this context useful information must be de-
fined to mean information that identifies specific aspects of a legal
system that are amenable to reforms designed to promote development.
No other type of information seems capable of supporting the optimistic
claim that it is possible to promote a society's development by modify-
ing specific features of its legal system.
Broadly speaking there are at least three ways in which a variable
that purports to measure characteristics of a legal system might in fact
fail to capture useful information of the sort that it purports to capture.
First, the variable in question may not refer exclusively to aspects of the
legal system. A legal system is typically defined as some sort of combi-
nation of norms and personnel, with the relevant norms usually being
limited to those that are applied or enforced by agents of the State. At the
margins there may be doubt about which norms and which personnel fall
within the scope of this definition and thus qualify as part of the legal
system, but it is clear that this way of defining a legal system serves to
exclude at least some features of a society and its inhabitants. So for ex-
ample, a variable that essentially measures the wealth of a society does
not seem to qualify as a measure of any characteristic of its legal system.
Similarly, variables that refer exclusively to characteristics of non-legal
norms or non-legal personnel should not qualify as legal variables. Fi-
nally, there are some variables-the recurring examples in this context
are crime rates-that describe the products of interaction between both
legal and non-legal factors. These types of variables are of limited use as
guides to legal reform unless it is clear how they respond to purely legal
institutional performance see Kurt Weyland, "Good Governance" and Development: A Skepti-
cal View (2004) (unpublished manuscript), and Michael Johnston, Measuring the New
Corruption Rankings: Implications for Analysis and Reform, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION 865
(A. J. Heidenheimer & M. Johnston eds., 2002).
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reforms. Of course, variables that do not relate exclusively to the legal
system might provide information about the potential effects of non-
legal reforms. Such information, however, is of little use to those who
press the claim that legal reforms are of crucial significance or who spe-
cialize in conducting legal reforms.
A second reason why a legal variable might prove to be unhelpful is
if it lacks precision. Sometimes this occurs because the variable captures
too broad a range of characteristics of a legal system to provide practical
guidance for reformers. For example, a variable measuring the "quality
of the legal system" is simply too highly aggregated to be of great assis-
tance to reformers with finite resources. On other occasions the lack of
precision stems from the fact that the label assigned to the variable does
not correspond, at least in ordinary usage, to what it in fact measures. This
frequently occurs because the variable is labeled to suggest that it captures
information about the functioning of a legal system in a broad range of
circumstances, such as enforceability of contracts simpliciter, when in fact
it captures a much narrower set of information, such as enforceability of
government contracts, which is not necessarily representative of the
broader set of information.
A third way in which a putative legal variable might prove to be un-
helpful to legal reformers is if it refers to aspects of a society that are not
amenable to reform. The clearest example of such a variable would be
one that captures purely historical information-which obviously cannot
be changed-without any analogue in any contemporary society.
Whether a legal system can trace its roots back to England or France
does not directly reveal anything about the present characteristics of its
legal system and so showing an association between French legal heri-
tage and poor development outcomes provides little guidance for
reformers. Less clear-cut examples would be variables that are theoreti-
cally amenable to reform, but in practice can only be manipulated with
difficulty. For example, in some societies fundamental constitutional
norms are extremely difficult to amend.
A final general approach to challenging optimistic statistical analy-
ses of the role of law in development is to question the inferences about
the relationship between law and development that researchers have
drawn from their data. For instance, studies of this kind are typically
vulnerable to the claim that the observed correlations simply reflect the
existence of an as yet unobserved factor that causes both the characteris-
tics of legal institutions and levels of development to vary without
implying any causal connection between the latter 
sets of variables.14
24. See generally, Janine Aron, Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence, 15
WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 99 (2000); T.N. Srinivasan & Jagdish Bhagwati,
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Another concern is that the researchers have failed to capture important
structural features of the relationship between the variables. For exam-
ple, they might characterize a relationship as linear when it is actually
non-linear. It may be the case, for instance, that judicial efficiency mat-
ters up to a point, but beyond that point its importance diminishes.
It is possible to criticize the inferences that researchers draw about
the relationship between legal systems and development even when they
use appropriate data to measure dimensions of both legal systems and
development. It is often even easier to mount such a critique, however,
when they use inappropriate data. For example, one way of misstating
the relationship between law and development would be to attribute high
levels of development principally to legal reforms when in fact develop-
ment is explained, at least to some extent, by interactions between the
legal system and other aspects of a society such as morality and eco-
nomic inequality. This type of error is particularly likely to occur if one
purports to measure the quality of a legal system by using data that actu-




The methodological concerns raised in the preceding Part are not
merely theoretical. In fact, a number of the most commonly used legal
variables are vulnerable to complaints that they do not capture useful
information or are incapable of supporting inferences about the relation-
ship between law and development.
A. Rule of Law
As mentioned above, a significant number of studies have found
what appear to be causal connections between variables that measure
respect for the rule of law and measures of social and economic devel-
26opment. The most commonly used source of data on respect for the rule
of law is a private publication known as the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), which provides quantitative assessments by unidentified
experts of the strength of the law and order tradition in various coun-
Outward-Orientation and Development: Are Revisionists Right? in TRADE DEVELOPMENT
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANNE 0. KRUEGER 3, 20-22 (Deepak Lal
& Richard H. Snape eds., 2001).
25. For a similar complaint that widely used measures of the quality of political institu-
tions are actually "outcome measures," see Glaeser et al., Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9 J.
ECON. GROWTH 271 (2004).
26. See sources cited supra in note 13.
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tries.2' According to the ICRG, the law and order variable is constructed
as follows:
Law and Order are assessed separately, with each sub-
component comprising zero to three points. The Law sub-
component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of
the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assess-
ment of popular observance of the law. Thus, a country can
enjoy a high rating-3-in terms of its judicial system, but a low
rating-l-if it suffers from a very high crime rate or if the law
is routinely ignored without effective sanction (for example,
widespread illegal strikes).28
For our purposes the first point to notice is that this variable clearly in-
cludes information about both the behavior of legal personnel and the
behavior of members of the general public. Consequently, it is difficult
to describe this measure of the rule of law as a purely legal variable. This
in turn means that studies showing a correlation between the rule of law
and development tell us little or nothing about the relationship between
the design of a legal system and development outcomes. Given the way
that this variable is defined, the widely observed statistical relationship
between the rule of law and development may boil down to a relation-
ship between crime rates and development.
Some might argue that crime rates and more generally rates of non-
compliance with the law are strongly determined by, and thus represent
reasonable proxies for, the presence of specific features in a society's
legal system. For example, one might presume that low crime rates in a
given society reflect the existence of a harsh criminal code or a large and
dedicated police force. Those rates might, however, also reflect the fact
that members of the local population are unusually willing to report
crimes, appear as witnesses in legal proceedings and shun offenders, or
that they have particularly deep ethical commitments to law abiding be-
havior. More generally, prevailing ethical norms and the extent of law-
abidingness are likely to depend upon an array of factors such as the
strength of families and other informal social networks, the extent of
poverty and economic inequality, and the degree to which state officials
27. The ICRG is one of two sources of cross-country institutional data whose use in
published studies is described as "High" by the World Bank. The other source is Freedom
House. However, the Freedom House data being referred to here are the data on political free-
doms and civil liberties, which is clearly not designed to provide exclusively legal
information. See WORLD BANK, INDICATORS OF GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY,
available at http://wwwl .worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm#research%20papers.
28. INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE, ABOUT ICRG, at http://
www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page+icrgmethods#_The-CompositeRisk.
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are perceived as exercising legitimate rather than illegitimate authority.
Legal rules and the manner in which they are enforced may influence
some or all of these features of a society, but any causal relationships are
likely to be subtle, indirect, and context-specific. Theoretically speaking,
it is even possible that strengthening laws or improving law enforcement
will undermine the ability of moral values and family structures to serve
as alternative methods of inducing compliance with the law. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to see how information about a society's crime
rates qualifies as a reasonable proxy for information about the character-
istics of its legal system.
There is also a second and more subtle reason for believing that the
ICRG's rule of law variable captures a combination of legal and non-
legal information. This concern stems from the fact that the variable is
based on subjective assessments made by individuals who are not neces-
sarily resident in the society to which their assessments pertain. Those
assessments will naturally be a function of the information available to
the assessors about the phenomena they are assessing. The nature of that
information may in turn, however, be a function of non-legal variables.
Most notably, unless the assessors rely exclusively on firsthand observa-
tions or official statistics, the nature of the information they obtain about
the behavior of both legal personnel and members of the general public
seems likely to depend heavily on the behavior of the local news media.
For example, perceptions of the integrity of state officials will depend in
part on the willingness of investigative journalists to uncover political
corruption. Similarly, perceptions of the frequency of various types of
crimes will typically depend on the media's willingness to report those
crimes. In principle, therefore, the apparent connection between low lev-
els of respect for the rule of law and underdevelopment could simply
reflect a relationship between aggressive media reporting and underde-
velopment. 9 Alternatively, if aggressive media activity is more common
in developed countries then existing studies might under-state the rela-
tionship between respect for the rule of law and development.
Even if the ICRG's rule of law variable were properly characterized
as a legal variable it would still be of limited utility. This is because as a
measure of "strength and impartiality" it does not refer to specific fea-
tures of the legal system that can be modified to promote development.
In addition, on account of biases and limits on the information available
to the ICRG's experts, the ICRG variable probably does not provide a
29. This possibility is not completely far-fetched. As Carothers points out, as part of a
more general trend towards democratization, many developing societies have recently become
more open and have begun to demonstrate greater tolerance for freedom of the press. See
Carothers, supra note 8.
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holistic assessment of any country's legal system. For example, the se-
lection of illegal strikes as opposed violations of health and safety
legislation to illustrate the concept of routine non-compliance with law is
telling.3° The significance of this point-and this general mode of criti-
cism-should not be overstated though. A study that suggests that
further work is warranted on methods of enhancing the strength and im-
partiality of a legal system deserves to be regarded as a contribution to
knowledge about the relationship between law and development; at a
minimum any such study contradicts claims that weak and biased legal
systems are either irrelevant or even conducive to development.
It is worth noting briefly that although the ICRG appears to be the
most popular source of rule of law data, there are other sources. The
variables constructed by some of these other sources give rise to the
same kinds of concerns about inclusion of non-legal information and
aggregation as the ICRG data. For instance, researchers at the World
Bank have constructed a rule of law index that combines variables drawn
from a number of different sources, including the ICRG.3 That index
clearly captures subjective non-legal information embedded in crime
data because in addition to the ICRG's law and order variable, it includes
variables such as "losses and costs of crime," "kidnapping of foreigners,"
"corruption in banking," "crime," "theft and crime," "crime and theft as
obstacles to business," "extent of tax evasion," and "costs of organized
crime for business."
B. Property Rights
There are a number of different sources of cross-national data on the
protection of property rights. In fact, the term property rights is used so
loosely by non-lawyers (as well as by some lawyers) that it often seems
to refer to virtually every possible type of legal norm and it is not un-
common to see variables such as the ICRG's rule of law variable
described as measures of the security of property rights. 2 Among the
variables explicitly defined as measures of the strength of property
rights, however, the best known is probably the one contained in the
Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom.33
30. I owe this observation to Frank Upham.
31. See KAUFMANN ET AL. supra note 13.
32. See, e.g., Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Financial Development, Property Rights,
and Growth, 58 J. FIN. 2401 (2003). For a similar complaint, see Donald C. Clarke, Economic
Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM J. COMp. L. 90, 99
(2003).
33. The Heritage Foundation describes itself as a think tank "whose mission is to for-
mulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise,
limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national
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The property rights component of the Index of Economic Freedom is
based upon information derived from publications by the Economist In-
telligence Unit and the State Department (which tend to use locally
based analysts). The calculation of countries' grades for property rights
is described in the following terms:
This factor scores the degree to which a country's laws protect
private property rights and the degree to which its government
enforces those laws. It also accounts for the possibility that pri-
vate property will be expropriated. In addition, it analyzes the
independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within
the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to en-
force contracts. The less legal protection of property, the higher
a country's score; similarly, the greater the chances of govern-
ment expropriation of property, the higher a country's score.
M
The actual grading scale used is as follows:
SCORE PROTECTION OF CRITERIA
PRIVATE PROPERTY
1 VERY HIGH Private property guaranteed by
the government; court system
efficiently enforces contracts;
justice system punishes those




2 HIGH Private property guaranteed by
the government; court system
suffers delays and is lax in
enforcing contracts; corruption
possible but rare; expropriation
unlikely.
3 MODERATE Court system inefficient and
subject to delays; corruption may
be present; judiciary may be
influenced by other branches of
government; expropriation
possible but rare.
defense." The Wall Street Journal is a well-known daily newspaper. The World Bank describes
the use in published studies of the Heritage Foundation's property rights variable as "Low" but
no other variables described as measures of property rights are described as being used more
frequently. See WORLD BANK, INDICATORS OF GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY,
supra note 27.
34. William W. Beach & Marc A. Miles, Explaining the Factors of the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom, in 2004 INDEX OF EcONOMIc FREEDOM (Marc A. Miles et al. eds., 2004).
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SCORE PROTECTION OF CRITERIA
PRIVATE PROPERTY
4 LOW Property ownership weakly
protected; court system
inefficient; corruption present;
judiciary influenced by other
branches of government;
expropriation possible.
5 VERY LOW Private property outlawed or not
protected; almost all property
belongs to the state; country in
such chaos (for example,
because of ongoing war) that
property protection is nonexistent;
judiciary so corrupt that property
is not effectively protected;
expropriation frequent.
In addition to reporting numerical grades for property rights (and other
variables), the Heritage Foundation provides brief discussions of the fac-
tors influencing the assigned grades. For example, here is the discussion
of the property rights grade assigned to Jamaica in 2004:
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Score: 3.0
The likelihood of expropriation is remote, and private property is
protected. The U.S. Department of State reports that "Jamaica's
legal system is based on English common law principles and the
rules in relation to the enforceability of contracts are therefore
based on the English common law. The Jamaican judicial system
therefore recognizes and upholds the sanctity of contracts."
However, the judiciary lacks adequate resources, and this creates
delays. In some cases, according to the U.S. Department of
State, "trials ... are delayed for years, and other cases are dis-
missed because files cannot be located." An inadequate police
force further weakens the security of property rights; the same
source reports that "crime poses a greater threat to foreign in-
vestment than do politically motivated activities."
Similarly, here is the discussion of the grade assigned to India in
2004:
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PROPERTY RIGHTS
Score: 3.0
Protection of property rights is applied unevenly in India. The
Economist Intelligence Unit reports that "large backlogs create
delays-sometimes years long-in reaching decisions. Con-
sequently, foreign corporations often include clauses for
international arbitration in their contracts." According to the U.S.
Department of State, "Critics say that liquidating a bankrupt com-
pany may take as long as 20 years." Protection of property for
local investors, particularly the smallest ones, is weak.
For present purposes there are a number of striking features of the Heri-
tage Foundation's property rights variable. The first is the fact that, like
the ICRG's rule of law variable, it seems to be picking up both legal and
non-legal information. For instance, the discussion of the Jamaican grade
suggests that in some countries at least the Heritage Foundation uses
crime rates as a factor in calculating the property rights grade. As out-
lined above there are a number of potential non-legal determinants of
crime rates.
A similar concern arises to the extent that the property rights vari-
able captures information about the likelihood of expropriation. 35 At first
glance this variable seems to be inherently legal in nature because it is
simply designed to capture information about the behavior of govern-
mental actors. The complicating factor, however, is that the behavior of
those governmental actors is often influenced by non-legal factors.36 For
instance, officials' willingness to expropriate property is likely to be de-
termined by levels of popular support for their actions which may in turn
be shaped by non-legal factors such as whether ownership of property is
17concentrated in the hands of foreigners or particular ethnic groups.
There is yet another sense in which the utility of the Heritage Foun-
dation's property rights variable is arguably compromised by the
inclusion of information pertaining to non-legal factors. The discussions
accompanying the grades for India and Jamaica reveal that the property
rights variable takes into account whether the capacities of legal organi-
zations such as the police or the civil courts are adequate in light of the
demand for their services. It seems incorrect to presume that the demand
for the services of legal organizations is wholly dependent on legal fac-
35. It is unclear from the Heritage Foundation's documentation whether they are con-
cerned with measuring the risk of expropriation or the risk of expropriation without
compensation.
36. Cf. Glaeser et al., supra note 25.
37. See Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995).
[Vol. 26:141
Rule of Law Reforms
tors. For example, the demand for policing depends in part on the vol-
ume of crime. Similarly, the demand for civil trials depends in part on
the volume of disputes in a society, which in turn depends, among other
things, on culturally determined attitudes towards resolving disputes
formally as opposed to informally.
The upshot of the preceding three points is that, along a number of
dimensions, the Heritage Foundation variable seems to capture informa-
tion about the interaction between legal and non-legal aspects of society,
rather than purely legal variables. Generally speaking, it is not clear that
this kind of information is useful because it makes it difficult to analyze
the merits of legal reforms. To illustrate, consider the fact that by taking
into account whether the courts are given enough resources to avoid de-
lays, the Heritage Foundation variable appears, at least in part, to provide
information on the extent to which legal institutions respond satisfacto-
rily to local demand for protection of property rights. On the one hand,
this kind of data can be used to justify claims that investments in hiring
and training additional judges will be conducive to development. On the
other hand, this information will be misleading if it turns out to be most
cost-effective to invest in altering the non-legal rather than the legal side
of the equation. For example, the easiest way of easing under-capacity in
the civil courts might be to encourage non-legal forms of dispute resolu-
tion.
Another striking feature of the Heritage Foundation's property rights
variable is the range of purely legal information that it appears to cap-
ture. In terms of legal categories, the country-specific discussions
reproduced above suggest that the property rights variable encompasses
virtually every aspect of the legal system, ranging from criminal law, to
bankruptcy law, to contract law, to civil procedure. The aggregation of
information about the protection of property rights from incursions by
both the government and private individuals may be particularly prob-
lematic. At a purely doctrinal level, in some legal systems the question of
whether there is an inviolable right to protection from expropriation
without compensation is regarded as a matter of constitutional law, while
the right to compensation for and protection from private actors' in-
fringements of property rights is governed by norms that do not originate
from the constitution. From a functional perspective this difference in
sources of law will be significant if, as is frequently the case, it is more
difficult to reform constitutional norms than it is to reform other types of
norms. Consequently, even if the property rights variable only captures
legal information, because it aggregates information about a number of
aspects of the legal system which cannot necessarily be manipulated
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through the same mechanisms or with equal ease, the variable may be of
limited use as a guide to legal reform.
Other variables purporting to measure the extent of protection of
property rights suffer from some or all of the defects of the Heritage
Foundation data. For instance, in connection with the preparation of the
1997 World Development Report, the World Bank conducted a survey of
approximately 3000 enterprises in sixty-nine countries. The purpose of
the survey was to understand private firms' perceptions of the constraints
that government action places on them. The two questions described by
the survey's authors as having to do with "security of property rights"
were as follows:
"Theft and crime are serious problems that can substantially in-
crease the costs of doing business." To what degree do you agree
with this statement?
"I am not confident that the state authorities protect my person
and my property from criminal actions." To what degree do you
agree with this statement?38
Both these questions seem to invite responses that describe existing lev-
els of crime and the state's capacity to deal with them. Again, it is not
clear to what extent crime levels are influenced by either the content of
legal norms or the manner in which they are enforced. Consequently, it
is not clear to what extent data derived from these survey questions can
be used to test claims about the independent role that legal reforms
might play in development.
Another popular source of cross-country data on property rights is
the ICRG's measure of the risk of government expropriation 39 This vari-
able is much more narrowly focused than the Heritage Fund's property
rights variable. As discussed above, however, it is not clear that the risk
of governmental expropriation is properly regarded as a purely legal
variable.
C. Contract Enforcement
Aside from protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts is
generally considered to be one of the most crucial economic functions
that a legal system can perform.40 Unfortunately, much of the cross-
38. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY,
available at http:// www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/wdr97data.html.
39. WORLD BANK, INDICATORS OF GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY, supra
note 27.
40. See Christopher Clague et al., supra note 17.
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national data that purports to measure the enforceability of contracts is
as unsatisfactory as the data on protection of property rights.
1. Contract Intensive Money
One prominent cross-country measure of the enforceability of con-
tracts is Clague's "contract-intensive money."' CIM is defined as the
ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply. The logic behind
this definition is that the more effective legal methods of enforcing con-
tracts and securing property rights are, the more willing actors in a
society should be to hold money in a form other than currency. This is
because the value of non-currency money depends upon both depositors'
ability to enforce claims against banks and banks' ability to enforce
claims against borrowers. Furthermore, because of its traceability, non-
currency money is not likely to be an attractive medium of exchange in
societies where the government not only declines to enforce but actively
prohibits a large number of transactions. Thus, its creators suggest that
CIM is a good measure of the quality of a society's legal institutions and,
as we have seen, recommend that societies with relatively low amounts
of CIM strive to improve the quality of their legal institutions.
One of the first things, however, to notice about CIM is that it does
not purport to be a highly specific measure of the enforceability of
contracts. In fact, its creators describe CIM as a measure of both the
enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This
aggregation across legal doctrines naturally limits CIM's potential utility
for legal reformers.
More fundamentally, CIM seems to be a measure of the combined
strength of both legal and non-legal factors that influence people's will-
ingness to hold non-currency money. There is simply no way to
determine whether societies with high CIM are societies in which actors
have faith in legal methods of recovering the value embodied in non-
currency forms of money, or are societies in which they have faith that
some combination of moral norms and social sanctions will discourage
other actors from reneging on their obligations.
2. ICRG
Another widely used measure of the enforceability of contracts is the
ICRG's measure of the risk that government will repudiate a contract.
This is defined as an assessment of "the risk of a modification in a
contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling
down" due to "budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in
41. Id.
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government or a change in government economic and social priorities.' 2
This variable is narrowly focused but, like the ICRG's measure of the
risk of expropriation, it is not clear that it captures useful legal
information because many of the factors that determine whether the
government decides to repudiate a contract may be non-legal in nature.
3. World Business Environment Survey
A broader and perhaps more useful cross-country measure of the en-
forceability of contracts can be found in the World Business
Environment Survey, which is administered to representatives of various
types of private enterprises by the World Bank in eighty countries and
one territory. One of the questions on that survey is as follows:
8. "I am confident that the legal system will uphold my contract
and property rights in business disputes."
To what degree do you agree with this statement?
Now 3 years ago
(1) fully agree
(2) agree in most cases
(3) tend to agree
(4) tend to disagree
(5) disagree in most cases
(6) fully disagree
43
This question requests data on a broad range of business disputes as op-
posed to just contractual disputes. Also, because it does not ask
respondents to elaborate upon the grounds for their assessments, further
research will be required to determine how various characteristics of the
legal system influence those assessments. For example, one might be
interested in whether confidence in the legal system is most greatly in-
fluenced by concerns about judicial integrity, or the time it takes a case
to get to trial, or the social distance between judges and litigants. Never-
theless, the data provided by this survey question seems capable of
providing more guidance to prospective legal reformers than do the
ICRG or CIM variables.
42. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
43. WORLD BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY, MEASURING CONDITIONS FOR BUSINESS
OPERATION AND GROWTH, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE QUESTIONNAIRE, available at http:ll
info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/wbes-questions.asp.
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4. The Lex Mundi Project
An even more useful source of data on the enforceability of con-
tracts is a paper entitled Courts derived from a study known as the Lex
Mundi project.' The authors of that study collected data on the proce-
dural steps required to enforce two simple types of contracts in 109
countries. Among other things they asked law firms in those countries to
describe all of the steps required to evict a tenant and collect on a bad
check in their country's largest city as well as the estimated time re-
quired to complete each step. They then demonstrate that the survey
responses can be coded in such a way as to enable statistical analyses of
the relationship between the norms and practices described by the re-
spondents and various indicators of the overall quality of the legal
system. Because the surveys poses highly specific questions and the
norms and practices described by the respondents may be readily modi-
fied, these data ought to be eminently useful to would-be legal
reformers.45
It is worth noting, however, that despite claims to the contrary by the
designers of the Lex Mundi study and others who have subsequently
used the study for the purposes of testing the relationship between law
and development, it is misleading to characterize data derived from this
study as an overall measure of the enforceability of contracts in any
given jurisdiction. At most, the data can be described as measures of the
enforceability of particular types of contracts in each jurisdiction as
there is no reason to presume that any given legal system treats all con-
tractual claims similarly. For example, in many jurisdictions residential
tenants are granted significant levels of protection from eviction for
ideological reasons that have no application in cases involving commer-
cial contracts. As for cases involving bounced checks, in some societies
checks are rarely used as methods of payment and so it may not be rea-
sonable to assume that proceedings based upon nonpayment of a check
will be routine and thus straightforward. This general concern seems to
be inherent in the methodology used in this study because in order to
obtain data that is comparable across countries from a survey of profes-
sionals it is important to question them about a specific scenario and
there will inevitably be limits on the extent to which it is possible to so-
licit information about variants of that scenario, even in contexts where
those variants are more relevant than the baseline scenario.
44. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003).
45. For other examples of such surveys of legal professionals, see WORLD BANK, Do-
ING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION, supra note 21.
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D. Legal Heritage
It is now well established that there is a correlation between a coun-
try's legal heritage and its levels of economic growth.4'6 Even if one
accepts the notion that these studies succeed in demonstrating a connec-
tion between legal heritage and development, 7 the studies are of little
direct use to prospective legal reformers, simply because a society's legal
heritage cannot be changed. From a reformer's perspective, the principal
lesson to be taken from these studies is that an effort ought to be made to
identify the distinctive contemporary characteristics of legal systems
associated with each legal heritage so that the connections between those
characteristics and indicia of development can be investigated directly.
This is the approach taken by Lee, who posits that the essential structural
differences between common law and civil law systems can be captured
by variables measuring the length of judges' tenure, whether precedent is
regarded as a source of law, and whether the ordinary courts have the
ultimate authority to control administrative action. 8 Unlike legal heritage
these variables represent specific features of a society's legal system that
ought to be amenable to reform. Consequently, from the perspective of
prospective legal reformers, Lee's variables seem to capture more useful
information than the legal heritage variables.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cross-country empirical analyses that purport to establish the exis-
tence of a causal relationship between legal reforms and development are
premised on the assumption that the legal variables that they use rea-
sonably capture characteristics of legal systems that are amenable to
reform. As we have seen, that assumption is not necessarily valid. Many
46. See generally Mahoney, supra note 15.
47. In a well-known series of articles, a group of scholars whose core consists of
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny has uncovered relationships between countries' legal heritages-common law, French
civil law, German civil law, etc.-and the extent to which their legal systems protect share-
holders' and creditors' rights, regulate entry of new firms, regulate labor markets, and adopt
formalistic judicial procedures. See Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J.
EcON. 1 (2002); Djankov et al., supra note 44; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); La Porta et al., supra note 42; Rafael La Porta et al.,
Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000); Juan Botero et
al., The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q. J. EcoN. 1339 (2004). My understanding of these studies
is that they are not designed to investigate the connection between legal heritage and devel-
opment. If this interpretation is correct then these studies are beyond the scope of the present
discussion.
48. Injae Lee, Essays on Legal System and Economic Performance (Jan. 2003) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, Department of Economics) (on file with
author).
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of the variables that are most commonly used to measure respect for the
rule of law, the protection of property rights and the enforceability of
contracts, fail this test because they do not necessarily describe purely
legal information. Meanwhile, the legal heritage variables do not seem to
capture information about aspects of contemporary legal systems that are
amenable to reform. Under the circumstances, the cross-country studies
that use this data provide little basis for favoring an optimistic rather
than a skeptical attitude towards the role of law in development. This
suggests that additional empirical research employing more useful legal
variables will be required in order to resolve this crucially important de-
bate. Fortunately, the state of the art in collection of this sort of data
continues to improve-witness, for instance, the advances reflected in
the data from the relatively recent World Business Environment Survey
and the Lex Mundi project (as compared to the ICRG or CIM data)-
and so eventually empirical research in this field may come to fulfill its
promise.

